NEWJERSEYJURORS ARE No LONGER COLOR-BLIND
REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
Eyewitness testimony in the criminal trial context constitutes a
point at which psychological and evidentiary principles converge.'
An eyewitness
account is the result of input, retention, and retrieval
2
processes. The accuracy of an eyewitness identification depends
largely upon psychological determinants such as observational
powers, memory, viewing conditions, and prompts to recall.2 Despite
I
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82 (1981). Eyewitness identification is defined as a "[t]ype of evidence by
which one who has seen the event testifies as to the person or persons involved from
his own memory of the event." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 408 (6th ed. 1991). An
eyewitness account is essentially "based on a theory-constructed by a human being
(with help from others)-about what reality was like in the past." ELLISON &
BUCKHOUT, supra,at 128-29.
Psychological principles applied to the issue of eyewitness identification in the
legal context are an outgrowth of ongoing research on human memory and
perception. See id. at 80. However, an incongruence exists in that even though
much has been learned through research, little has been applied in the legal arena.
See id.
2 See Peter J. Cohen, How Shall They Be Known? Daubert
v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 242 (1996).
Human memory of any given event is not tantamount to an exact recording, such as
a video taping. See id There are three distinct stages that make up the memory
process. See id. In the first stage, information about an event enters the memory. See
id. During this acquisition stage, factors specific to the actual event (e.g., lighting
and duration) and factors unique to the witness (e.g., stress and fear) may alter the
accuracy of the encoding. See id. at 242-43. Subsequently, an observer's attempt to
remember the event with the passage of time constitutes the retention stage. See id.
at 242. The retention stage is susceptible to the passage of time and post-event
information. See id. at 243. Ultimately, the witness attempts to recall the information
during the retrieval stage, which the manner of questioning and witness confidence
level may affect. See id.
The limitations of human mental processes are unalterable, but the courts
should address the reality of sources of misidentification accordingly through
prevention or detection. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in
Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 934, 986 (1984); see also United States v. Russell,
532 F.2d 1063, 1066 (6th Cir. 1976). In Russell, the Sixth Circuit noted a strong
potential for misidentification when a witness observes a stranger in a single instance
under stressful conditions. See id. at 1066. The court commented that the justice
system must take measures to ensure that no further distortions of potentially
mistaken perceptions occur. See id.
3 See EDWARD ARNOLDS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY STRATEGIES AND TACTICS §
JUSTICE
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so many variables, eyewitness testimony plays a prominent role in the
criminal justice system.4 Jurors generally tend to attach significant
weight
to
eyewitness
testimony;5
consequently,
mistaken
identifications can lead to wrongful convictions of innocent people.6
1.03, at 5 (1984).
A commonly used classroom simulation demonstrates the
inconsistencies of eyewitness identification. See ELLISON & BUCKHtOUT, supra note 1,
at 82-83. A staged crime occurs during a professor's lecture. See id. at 83. Once the
assailant exits the room, the student-eyewitnesses complete questionnaires about the
incident. See id. Results indicate that "eyewitness accounts of events differ drastically
from one another, the ranges of physical descriptions are large and discrepant,
clothing and physical objects are not agreed on, and the majority of the witnesses are
unable to pick out the assailant from a lineup staged at a later time." Id.
4 See Jennifer L. Devenport & Steven D. Penrod, Eyewitness
Identification Evidence:
Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 338, 338 (1997);

Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection with Pretrial
Identification Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 Ky. LJ. 259, 261 (1991)
("[N]otwithstanding its well-recognized unreliability, eyewitness identification
testimony is featured frequently and prominently in criminal trials."); see also
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES at ix (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth

F. Loftus eds., 1987). Rape and robbery prosecutions usually rely heavily upon
identification evidence. See Joseph D. Grano, A Legal Response to the Inherent
Dangers of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, in EYEITNESS TESTIMONY:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 315, 315.

Eyewitness identification, in some

instances, may be the only evidence linking the accused to the criminal act. See id.;
see, e.g., United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650, 651, 653 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding
that the trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction on mistaken identity was
reversible error when the government's case was essentially based on three
eyewitnesses' identifications of defendant cashing a stolen check); United States v.
Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1974) (adopting a model jury instruction on
identification for use in cases that involve eyewitness testimony as the sole evidence
of identification); Arizona v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1212, 1224 (Ariz. 1983)
(finding error in the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony when no direct or
circumstantial evidence other than the eyewitness identification of two witnesses
connected defendant to three murders and drug transportation); State v. Frey, 194
NJ. Super. 326, 329, 476 A.2d 884, 885 (App. Div. 1984) (stating that the sole
evidence of a sexual assault/kidnap victim's testimony, coupled with defendant's
denial of guilt, merited a jury instruction on identification). In these situations,
accuracy of the eyewitness testimony is of utmost importance ifjustice is to be served.
See EYEwITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra, at ix.

5 See ARNOLDS ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.03, at 5. The United States Supreme
Court has also recognized unwarranted juror reliance on eyewitness testimony. See
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) ("[D]espite its inherent unreliability,
much eyewitness identification evidence has a powerful impact on juries.").
6

See EYEwrFNESS TESTIMONY:

PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at ix.

Erroneous identifications have caused more injustice than perhaps any other factor.
See NATHAN R. SOBEL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS at

vi (1972). Research indicates that wrongful convictions are largely attributed to
mistaken identification. See Devenport & Penrod, supra note 4, at 338.
There are 349 documented wrongful convictions for capital crimes committed
in the twentieth century. See Cindy J. O'Hagan, Note, When Seeing Is Not Believing:
The Casefor Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 741 n.7 (1993) (citing Tim
Rutten, As April 21 Nears, The Executioner's Song Grows Louder, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19,

1226

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 30:1224

Both legal authorities and researchers in the field of psychology
have acknowledged the shortcomings of eyewitness identification
evidence.7 Factors negatively affecting the accuracy of an eyewitness's
identification include "speed and movement, stimulus overload, the
fact that the perpetrator is a stranger to the witness, diversion of
attention, excessive arousal, surprise, and limitations on the
opportunity to observe the face." 8 These hindrances are particularly
unsettling because an eyewitness's ability to identify positively an
alleged perpetrator's face is normally a threshold requirement in

1992, at El). Of these 349 innocent persons, 23 were executed. See id. Estimates of
mistaken convictions for crimes range between 7500 and 150,000 on a yearly basis.
See Cohen, supra note 2, at 254. In a study of more than 500 erroneous convictions,
mistaken identifications accounted for 60% of the cases. See Devenport & Penrod,
supra note 4, at 338 (citing C.R. Huff, Wrongful Conviction: Societal Tolerance of
Injustice, 4 REs. INSOC. PROBS. & PUB. POL'Y 99-115 (1987)). Another compilation of
65 wrongful convictions included 29 cases that were attributed to mistaken
eyewitness identifications. See O'Hagan, supra, at 741 (citing EDWIN M. BORCHARD,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932)).
Despite the demonstrated potential for wrongful convictions, the law historically
has been hesitant to accept the findings of psychological research. See ARNOLDS ET
AL., supra note 3, § 1.04, at 6. Much of the initial research literature on eyewitness
testimony was in German, and, therefore, American jurists could not easily evaluate
the findings. See id. Guy Montrose Whipple, beginning in 1909, contributed to
resolving this dilemma by translating much of the foreign findings (e.g., works of
Stern, Borst, Obsien, Binet, and Gross) into English. See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F.
Loftus, Eyewitness Research: Then and Now, in EYEWrrNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 1, 5. Once the research was made accessible and
understandable, American jurists were still hesitant to accept and utilize such
findings. See id. The resulting neglect over the years may be attributed to the fact
that courts highly value eyewitness testimony for its evidentiary value and the
tendency for research to be restricted to artificial laboratory environments makes it
less generalizable to real world situations. See ELLISON & BuCKHoUT, supra note 1, at
80.
The first formal attempt by the United States Supreme Court to devise
constitutional safeguards against the pitfalls of eyewitness identification did not
occur until 1967. See SOBEL, supra, at 1-2. Prior to 1967, criminal courts essentially
neglected inaccuracies of eyewitness identification. See id. at 2.
7 See Devenport & Penrod, supra note 4, at 339. Efforts of researchers
in the
field of psychology have focused on isolating the sources of misidentification and
correction of the problem. See id. In the legal community, attempts are made to
safeguard against wrongful convictions. See id. Examples of specific safeguards
include "the presence of counsel at postindictment, live lineups, opportunities for
motions to suppress identifications, cross-examination of identifying witnesses, and
expert psychological testimony about factors that influence eyewitness memory." Id.
(citations omitted).
The degree of attorney reliance on psychological research findings regarding
eyewitness identification is stifled by "discussions of experimental methods, the use
of statistics, and the specialized language." Michael Owen Miller & Thomas A.
Mauet, The Psychology ofJuty Persuasion,22 AM.J. TRIALADVOC. 549, 549 (1999).
8 ELLISON & BUCKHouT, supranote 1, at 83.
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criminal proceedings.' Further complications arise when the accused
is a member of a different race from that of the observer-a crossracial identification.' 0
The significant weight that jurors attach to eyewitness testimony,
coupled with its vulnerability to inaccuracies, have prompted some
courts to safeguard against misidentification."
Suppression
4
hearings,'2
cross-examination, '3 and summations
represent
9 See id. at 88.
The law is also settled to the extent that one person's
identification of an alleged criminal actor is sufficient grounds for a case to go to the
jury and that such a rule does not constitute a denial of due process rights. See Holley,
502 F.2d at 274.
Psychologists propose that facial recognition places demands upon the human
memory process that are distinct from memorizing words, happenings, or sounds.
See ELLISON & BUCKHOUT, supra note 1, at 88. Laboratory tests show more than a 90%
success rate for subjects shown pictorial images of a face and later tested for
recognition of the same image. See id. at 88-89. Such results, however, cannot
necessarily be generalized to real life situations in which an eyewitness sees a face "in
motion, under a variety of changing lighting conditions and embedded in a rich
context of other visual events and objects." Id. at 89.
10 See Hadyn D. Ellis, PracticalAspects of Face Memory, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 12, 17 ("It is a commonplace
observation that faces drawn from an unfamiliar race are more difficult to remember
than own-race faces.").
Criminal cases involving a perpetrator and a witness of different races pose the
dilemma of a cross-racial identification. See generally United States v. Norwood, 939 F.
Supp. 1132 (D.N.J. 1996) (involving Caucasian eyewitnesses and an African-American
defendant charged with, among other things, unlawful possession of a handgun,
aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit carjacking, and theft); State v. Gaines, 926
P.2d 641 (Kan. 1996) (involving a cross-racial identification of a Native American
defendant in a rape, kidnapping, and criminal sodomy case); Commonwealth v.
Engram, 686 N.E.2d 1080 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (involving Caucasian victims
confronted by an African-American stranger wielding a gun); White v. State, 926 P.2d
291 (Nev. 1996) (involving a cross-racial identification of an African-American
defendant in a murder and robbery case); Nelson v. State, 914 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1996) (involving the identification of an African-American armed robber by a
Japanese male); Currie v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 335 (Va. CL App. 1999)
(involving a cross-racial identification of an African-American male by a female
victim in an assault and battery, a burglary, and an attempted rape case).
1 SeeJoel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the

Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y& L. 589, 609 (1997).

A suppression hearing is defined as "[a] pretrial proceeding in criminal cases
in which a defendant seeks to prevent the introduction of evidence alleged to have
been seized illegally." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1004 (6th ed. 1991). Courts enforce
a defendant's right to counsel during post-indictment lineups and right to due
process by suppressing a pretrial identification found to violate such rights. See
Johnson, supra note 2, at 951.
is "Cross-examination" is defined as "[t]he examination of a witness upon a trial
or hearing, or upon taking a deposition, by the party opposed to the one who
produced him, upon his evidence given in chief, to test its truth, to further develop
it, or for other purposes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (6th ed. 1991). Many courts
disallow expert testimony on cross-racial recognition impairment, reasoning that
12
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opportunities for defense attorneys to shield against mistaken
identifications of their clients. 5 Although less widely accepted by
courts, the use of expert testimony about eyewitness identification is
another potential safeguard against misidentification.' 6 The risks
posed by basic eyewitness identification and, particularly, cross-racial
identification, may also be addressed through the use of a cautionary
jury charge in which the judge
instructs the jury how properly to
7
evaluate eyewitness testimony.1
cross-examination is the proper way to approach the credibility of a witness account.
SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 953.
" "Summation" is defined as "a recapitulation by attorneys and,
sometimes,
judge of the evidence adduced, in order to draw the attention of the jury to the
salient points at issue." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1001 (6th ed. 1991). Some courts
consider jury instructions on cross-racial recognition impairment unnecessary
because counsel for the defense can include the issue in a closing argument. See
Johnson, supra note 2, at 955.
15 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 951 (discussing manners
in which defense
attorneys attempt to protect their clients from mistaken identifications).
16 See id., at 958-59.
One commentator has noted that "[flederal courts have
been very reluctant to admit expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness
identifications; one circuit has held that such testimony is never admissible."
O'Hagan, supra note 6, at 757 (citing United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315
(11th Cir. 1984)). The trial judge's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony
regarding eyewitness identification is generally discretionary. See id. (citing United
States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984)).
Expert testimony regarding eyewitness reliability may remedy the problem of
juror inability to assess eyewitness identification accuracy. See Christopher M.
Walters, Comment, Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 1402, 1402 (1985). Expert testimony on eyewitness identification attempts "to
bolster the jury's own ability to assess the evidence." Id. at 1406.
17 SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 974. Federal and state jurisdictions
have adopted
cautionary jury instructions. See id. at 978-79 (noting that all federal courts of appeals
except the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which have not yet faced the issue, approve of
the cautionary instruction; noting also that state courts, such as those of New York,
Kansas, West Virginia, and Massachusetts, have approved of the use of the cautionary
instruction). "Charge to the jury" is defined as "[t]he final address by judge to jury
before verdict, in which he sums up the case, and instructs jury as to the rules of law
which apply to its various issues, and which they must observe." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 159 (6th ed. 1991). "Special charge to the jury" is defined as "[a] charge
or instruction given by the court to the jury, upon some particular point or question
involved in the case, and usually in response to counsel's request for such
instruction." Id.
Courts adopted pattern jury instructions because faulty jury instructions were
the most common cause for reversal. See Bruce Dennis Sales et al., Improving
Comprehensionfor Jury Instructions, in 1 THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23, 24 (Bruce
Dennis Sales, ed. 1977). These pattern instructions were intended to provide the
judge with a precise and succinct statement of the law that the average juror would
understand. See id.
A jury instruction serves as an educational tool for informing jurors about the
significant issues in, and law applicable to, the case. See Gabriel v. Auf Der
Heidearagona, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 558, 564, 82 A.2d 644, 647 (App. Div. 1951). The
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In New Jersey v. Cromedy, 8 the New Jersey Supreme Court
considered whether an African-American defendant was entitled to a
cross-racial jury instruction when the only evidence linking the
defendant to the crime was an identification provided by a Caucasian
eyewitness. 9 The court held that, despite a lack of consensus in the
scientific community, the strong potential for inaccurate cross-racial
identification is
identifications requires ajury charge when eyewitness
20
exists.
evidence
corroborating
no
and
a central issue
The crime for which McKinley Cromedy stood trial occurred in a
New Brunswick, New Jersey apartment on August 28, 1992.2 D.S., a
white, female college student was watching television when an
African-American male intruder suddenly appeared in her well-lit
apartment.2 2 After seizing D.S.'s cash and charge cards, the stranger

adjusted the window blinds and led her into the illuminated
kitchen. 2 Standing behind D.S., the intruder demanded that she
remove her shorts and then sexually assaulted her. 4 After the attack,

trial judge must pose to the jury "the material and substantial issues of fact disclosed
by the pretrial order, drawn into controversy by the conflicting, divergent, and
contradictory evidence adduced at the trial and to be submitted to the jury for
determination, together with instructions in the law adapted to the consideration of
such issues." Id. at 565, 82 A.2d at 648.
Some research indicates, however, that jurors given eyewitness identification
instructions are no more sensitive to the fallacies of eyewitness identification than are
uninstructed jurors, except to the extent that instructed jurors are less influenced by
eyewitness testimony when poor visibility conditions exist. See Lieberman & Sales,
supra note 11, at 609 (referencing E. Greene, Judge's Instruction on Eyewitness
Testimony: Evaluationand Revision, 18J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 252 (1988)).
18 158 N.J. 112, 727 A.2d 457
(1999).
19 See Cromedy, 158 NJ. at 115, 727
A.2d at 458-59.
See i& at 132, 727 A.2d at 467 ("We embrace the ... rule requiring a crossracial identification charge under the circumstances of this case despite some
differences of opinion among the researchers."). The State argued that a lack of
agreement in the research community as to cross-racial recognition impairment
contradicts the need for a special jury charge. See id. at 130, 727 A.2d at 466. The
court, however, rejected the State's argument and maintained that this case did not
turn on the introduction of any scientific evidence or expert testimony to discredit
the identification of the accused, but instead entailed mere common experience. See
id.

See id. at 115-16, 727 A.2d at 459.
See id.
23 See id. at 116, 727 A.2d at 459. The perpetrator
claimed that he needed money
to reach New York to evade arrest for murder. See id.
24 See id. ("The intruder... vaginally penetrated D.S. from behind.").
21
22
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D.S. turned and faced her rapist before he exited the apartment.
2
6
Once alone, the victim contacted the local police department.
Law enforcement personnel immediately reported to the scene
and obtained the victim's statement before she was taken to the
hospital for treatment and rape samples. 7 D.S. provided a detailed
description of the clothing worn by the rapist, whom she
characterized as an "African-American male in his late 20's to early
30's, full-faced, about five feet five inches tall, with a medium build,
mustache, and unkempt hair."2M D.S., however, did not identify
Cromedy as her attacker the following day when she was shown an
array of photographs that included the defendant.29 Eight months
later, however, the victim saw the defendant on the street and,
believing him to be her attacker, immediately contacted the police."
Within fifteen minutes, the police took the defendant into custody
and arrested him after D.S. made a positive identification in a
"showup" procedure.'
The defendant provided the police with blood and saliva
samples, none of which linked him to the crime.32 Consequently, the
25 See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 116, 727 A.2d at 459.
When D.S. turned to face her
attacker, she "was standing approximately two feet away from her assailant." Id.
See id.
2
27 See id&
Id. D.S. further described her attacker as "wearing a dirty gray button-down
short-sleeved shirt, blue warm-up pants with white and red stripes, and a Giants logo
on the left leg." Id.
29 See
i&.
30 See id. at 117, 727 A.2d
at 459.
See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 117, 727 A.2d at 459. A "showup" is defined as a
It]ne-to-one confrontation between suspect and witness to crime. A
type of pre-trial identification procedure in which a suspect is
confronted by or exposed to the victim of or witness to a crime. It is
less formal than a lineup but its purpose is the same. Commonly, it
occurs within a short time after the crime or under circumstances
which would make a lineup impracticable or impossible.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 962 (6th ed. 1991). Lineups differ in that "the suspect... is
exhibited, along with others with similar physical characteristics, before the victim or
witness to determine if he can be identified as having committed the offense." Id. at
641 (defining "lineup"). Although suggestive methods of identification are more
conducive to misidentification, "the admission of evidence of a showup without more
does not violate due process." Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972).
22 See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 117, 727 A.2d at 459. Defendant's
fingerprints were not
found in the victim's apartment. See id. In contrast to the victim, defendant was
identified as a "non-secretor" by the New Jersey State Police Chemistry Biology
"Non-secretors," who constitute
See id., 727 A.2d at 459-60.
Laboratory.
approximately 20% of the population, do not secrete their blood type in their bodily
fluids. See id., 727 A.2d at 459. In addition, both the victim and defendant had type
Because defendant fell into these
See id., 727 A.2d at 459-60.
"A" blood.
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only evidence the prosecution presented at the criminal trial was
D.S.'s eyewitness identification.s At the close of trial, the defendant
requested that the jury receive an instruction from the judge on
cross-racial identification.'
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law
classifications, the semen found on the victim could not be matched conclusively
with Cromedy or used to exonerate him as the perpetrator. See id., 727 A.2d at 460.
The public defender representing Cromedy, Anderson D. Harkov, sought DNA
testing to no avail as the trial judge disallowed such testing. See Ronald Smothers,
DNA Tests Free Man After 6 Years; HadBeen Convicted in Rape of Student, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 1999, at B6.
33 See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at
132, 727 A.2d at 467.
34 See id. at 118, 727 A.2d at 460. For a
cross-racial instruction, defense counsel
proposed the following language:
You know that the identifying witness is of a different race than the
defendant. When a witness who is a member of one race identifies a
member who is of another race we say there has been a cross-racial
identification. You may consider, if you think it is appropriate to do so,
whether the cross-racial nature of the identification has affected the
accuracy of the witness's original perception and/or accuracy of a
subsequent identification.
Id. In support of defendant's request for an instruction to the jury on cross-racial
identification, he referred to the final report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Task
Force on Minority Concerns. See id.
Refusing the defendant's request, the trial court alternatively issued the model
jury charge on eyewitness identification. See id. As of November 26, 1990, the Model
Jury Charge on Identification, in pertinent part, states:
The defendant as part of (his/her) general denial of guilt contends
that the State has not presented sufficient reliable evidence to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that (he/she) is the person who committed
the alleged offense. Where the identity of the person who committed
the crime is in issue the burden of proving that identity is upon the
State. The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this
defendant is the person who committed the crime. The defendant has
neither the burden nor the duty to show that the crime, if committed,
was committed by someone else or to prove the identity of that other
person. You must determine, therefore, not only whether the State has
proved each and every element of the offense charged beyond a
reasonable doubt, but also whether the State has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that this defendant is the person who committed it.
In order to meet its burden with respect to the identification of the
culprit the State has presented the testimony of the witness.

You will recall that this witness identified the defendant in court as the
person who committed the offense.
According to the witness,
(his/her) identification of the defendant in court is based upon the
observations and perceptions which (he/she) made of the defendant
on the scene at the time the offense was being committed. It is your
function as jurors to determine what weight, if any, to give to this
testimony. You must decide whether it is sufficiently reliable evidence
upon which to conclude that this defendant is the person who
committed the offense charged.
In going about your task you should consider the testimony of the
witness in the light of the customary criteria concerning credibility as I
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Division declined the defendant's request, noting that the New Jersey
Supreme Court had not yet formally adopted the report of the Task
Force on Minority Concerns calling into question the accuracy of
cross-racial identifications.35 The trial court further pointed out that
no expert testimony on the subject of cross-racial identification had
been presented during the trial. t Ultimately, the jury convicted the
defendant of aggravated sexual assault, robbery, burglary, and
terroristic threats s7
The defendant, emphasizing that the entire case hinged upon
the victim's cross-racial identification, appealed on the issue of an
inadequate jury instruction.
The appellate division held that the
trial court did not err when it declined to issue a jury charge specific
to cross-racial identification.39
In reaching its conclusion, the
majority noted that the law concerning the admissibility of expert
testimony on cross-racial identification was not yet settled in New
Jersey. 40 Judge Shebell dissented, stating that the trial court's failure
have explained them to you. It is particularly appropriate that you
consider the capacity or the ability of the witness to make observations
or perceptions as you gauge it to be and that you consider the
opportunity which the witness had at the time and under all of the
attendant circumstances for seeing that which (he/she) says (he/she)
saw or that which (he/she) says (he/she) perceived with regard to
(his/her) identification of the person who committed the alleged
offense.
NewJersey's Model Jury Charge on Identification, Nov. 26, 1990.
35 See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 118, 727 A.2d at 460.
The Task Force originated out of
ChiefJustice Robert N. Wilentz's directive for an investigation of the treatment given
to minorities in the court system with the goal of suggesting remedies that would be
within the judiciary's power to institute. See New Jersey Supreme Court FinalReport of the
Task Force on Minority Concerns, 131 N.J. L.J. 1145, 1145 (1992). The Task Force
included the Subcommittee on Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification, which was
formed to determine whether race differences among witnesses and criminals are
correlated with erroneous identifications. See id. at 1154. The subcommittee
examined commonly used identification procedures, the relative determinative
weight of eyewitness identification in criminal prosecutions, and the reliability of
identification when the accused and accuser are of different races. See id. The
subcommittee concluded that eyewitness identification is not as reliable as commonly
perceived and, furthermore, that the legal community remains uneducated about
the decreased reliability of cross-racial identifications. See id. at 1154-55. One
recommendation was for the Supreme Court to develop instructions that caution
jurors as to the unreliability of eyewitness testimony and cross-racial identifications,
in particular. See id. at 1155.
See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 118, 727 A.2d at 460.
7 See id.
See id.
39 See
id.
40 See id. at 118-19, 727 A.2d at 460 (citing State
v. Gunter, 231 N.J. Super. 34, 4048, 554 A.2d 1356, 1359-64 (App. Div. 1989)). The appellate court was averse to
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to direct the jury's attention to the risks associated with cross-racial
identification denied the defendant of his right to an impartial trial.4
Unsuccessful at the appellate division, the defendant exercised
his right to come before the state's highest court. 42 Echoing the
concern articulated in Judge Shebell's dissenting opinion at the
appellate division, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously
reversed Cromedy's convictions and remanded the case for a new
trial. 43 The court held that a cautionary jury charge on cross-racial
requiring a cross-racial instruction because, according to State v. Gunter, expert
testimony on cross-racial identification was not yet approved in New Jersey. See id.
Gunter involved a robbery and aggravated assault at a McDonald's fast food restaurant
in Sussex County, New Jersey. See Gunter, 231 NJ. Super. at 37, 554 A.2d at 1357.
The restaurant manager's eyewitness identification was essentially the only evidence
linking defendant to the crime. See id. at 38, 554 A.2d at 1358. The trial judge in
Gunter excluded expert testimony that would have offered opinions as to the
unreliability of cross-racial identification, weapon-focus theory, and the effect of
stress on memory and perception. See id. at 40-41, 554 A.2d at 1359-60. Defendant
was convicted and appealed on the issue of admissibility of expert testimony on
eyewitness identification. See id. at 39, 554 A.2d at 1359. In Gunter, the appellate
division remanded to the trial court the admissibility issue of expert testimony for a
Rule 8 hearing, reasoning that a preliminary hearing should have been held to
determine whether expert testimony would assist the jury beyond a common-sense
understanding of eyewitness identification. See id. at 47-48, 554 A.2d at 1363.
41 See Cromedy, 158 NJ. at 119, 727 A.2d at 460. Judge
Shebell stated:
Ajury instruction that contains no direct reference to the hidden fires
of prejudice and bias which may be stoked by an incident such as the
sexual assault in question and fails to call the jury's attention to the
problems of cross-racial identification, so well documented by the [New
Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Minority Concerns], denies
minority defendants, such as McKinley Cromedy, their constitutional
right to a fair trial.
Id. (brackets in original). Judge Shebell's warning about the drawbacks associated
with cross-racial identification was prophetic in that McKinley Cromedy was
ultimately proven innocent through DNA testing.
See infra note 136 and
accompanying text.
42 See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 119, 727 A.2d at 460. The issue of ajury
instruction
pertaining to cross-racial identification came before the state's highest court as a
matter of right pursuant to Rule 2:2-1(a) (2). See id. New Jersey Rules of Court 2:21 (a) provides:
Appeals may be taken to the Supreme Court from final judgments as of
right: (1) in cases determined by the Appellate Division involving a
substantial question arising under the Constitution of the United States
or this State; (2) in cases where, and with regard to those issues as to
which, there is a dissent in the Appellate Division; (3) directly from the
trial courts in cases where the death penalty has been imposed and in
post-conviction proceedings in such cases; (4) in such cases as are
provided by law.
N.J. CT. R. 2:2-1(a). The New Jersey Supreme Court also granted certification on
issues restricted to those identification issues not addressed by the appellate decision
dissenting opinion. See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 119, 727 A.2d at 460.
43 See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 133, 727 A.2d at
467-68.
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identification is required whenever identification is a central issue in
the case and eyewitness testimony by a member of a different race
constitutes the sole evidence linking the defendant to the crime."
The court also held, however, that cross-racial recognition
impairment falls within the ambit of "commonsense" and, thus,
expert testimony on the matter is inadmissible pursuant to the New
Jersey Rules of Evidence. 5
A significant potential for misidentification arises when a witness
recognizes a stranger following a momentary observation under
stressful conditions. 6 This risk has prompted state and federal courts
alike to proceed with caution
when addressing eyewitness testimony
4
in a variety of contexts. 1
See id. at 132, 727 A.2d at 467 ("A cross-racial instruction should be given only
when, as in the present case, identification is a critical issue in the case, and an
eyewitness's cross-racial identification is not corroborated by other evidence giving it
44

independent reliability.").
45 See id. at 133, 727 A.2d at 467-68. The court
noted that expert testimony would
be inadmissible because of the "widely held commonsense view that members of one
race have greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race." Id.
(quoting United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring) (internal quotations omitted)).
Rule 702 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, which the Cromedy court cited,
provides that, only "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." N.J. R. EVID. 702. The use of
the phrase "scientific knowledge" in Rule 702 is intended to allow testimony only on
information arrived at through the scientific method, which attempts to ensure
reliability. See Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New
Pairof Glassesfor theJury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1013, 1029 (1995).
As set forth in relevant case law, the requirements for admitting expert
testimony are:
(1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is
beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at
a state of the art such that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently
reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the
intended testimony.
State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208, 478 A.2d 364, 379 (1984).
46 See United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063, 1066 (6th Cir. 1976).
The Supreme
Court has noted that "[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the
annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification." United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
47 See Michael H. Hoffheimer, Criminal Law: Requiring Jury Instructions
on
Eyewitness IdentificationEvidence at FederalCriminal Trials,80J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
585, 585 (1989) ("During the 1960s, in the wake of scholarship and Supreme Court
opinions that called attention to the serious problem of misidentification in criminal
trials, federal circuit courts began to join a growing number of state and foreign
common-law jurisdictions that required or encouraged use of identification
instructions." (footnotes omitted)).
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The "Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy""-three cases decided on the
same day in 1967-reflects the United States Supreme Court's
concern for mistaken eyewitness identifications in criminal cases.49 In
United States v. Wade,"° the Court considered whether in-court
identifications of the defendant should be barred from evidence
because law enforcement officials had placed the defendant in a
pretrial lineup without giving notice to defense counsel."' Stressing
Courts have addressed eyewitness identification in many different contexts,
including witness testimony, pretrial lineups, admissibility of expert testimony,
pretrial showup procedures, and photographic displays. See, e.g., United States v.
Hunter, 692 A.2d 1370, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (involving a challenge to witness
identification of robbers in a showup procedure); Lyons v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 499, 504
(2d Cir. 1996) ("The issue of misidentification is absolutely fundamental to a
criminal trial. Although this case seems to be solidly built upon the identification of
three eyewitnesses, this court has noted on more than one occasion that eyewitness
testimony is often highly inaccurate."); State v. Love, 986 P.2d 358, 361 (Kan. 1999)
(involving a defendant's attempt to suppress a pretrial identification because a
photographic lineup leading to a murder charge was impermissibly suggestive); State
v. Glover, 951 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) ("If. . . the court finds that the
pretrial identification procedures were unduly suggestive, the court must proceed to
the second step and determine whether the suggestive procedures have so tainted
the identification as to lead to a substantial likelihood that the pretrial identification
was not reliable."); State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944-45 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("We
hold that when presented with the issue of the constitutional admissibility of
eyewitness identification testimony, a trial court must ... legally determine whether
the eyewitness identification is reliable."); Rodriquez v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d
724, 725 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (exploring the admissibility of expert testimony
regarding eyewitness identification in the context of suggestive eyewitness
identification procedures).
Problems with eyewitness identification have been addressed in relation to the
right to counsel during generic lineup procedures, in-court identifications, due
process, photographic displays, suggestive lineup procedures, and showup
procedures. See Russell 532 F.2d at 1067 (providing a brief track record of the
Supreme Court's forays into these areas).
See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (giving
the
cases this collective name).
49 See Lisa Manshel, The Child Witness and the Presumption of Authenticity
After State
v. Michaels, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 685, 714 (1996) ("Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall reflect
the Court's concern with the problems of eyewitness identification. Usually, the
witness must testify about an encounter with a total stranger under circumstances of
emergency or emotional stress. The witness' recollection of the stranger can be
distorted easily."); see also David E. Paseltiner, Note, Twenty Years of Diminishing
Protection: A Proposalto Return to the Wade Trilogy's Standards, 15 HOFsTRA L. REV. 583,
607 (1987) (encouraging a return to the standards set forth by the Wade trilogy-fair
trials for defendants and sanctions on police misconduct).
50 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
51 See Wade, 388 U.S. at 219-20. The facts of this case involved
a robbery of a
Texas bank, during which a man wearing sections of tape on both sides of his face
held a gun on two bank personnel and demanded they fill a pillowcase with cash. See
id. at 220. The robber escaped in a stolen vehicle driven by an accomplice. See id.
After an indictment was returned and counsel appointed, an FBI agent placed the
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the "innumerable dangers and variable factors"52 associated with
eyewitness identification, the Court held that a post-indictment
lineup is a critical stage of a criminal prosecution during which the
accused is entitled to legal representation.5 3 Accordingly, the Court
defendant in a lineup procedure without notifying the defendant's attorney. See id.
The two bank employees selected defendant as the robber out of six or seven men.
See id. At trial, the bank employees also identified the defendant as the robber. See
id.
To no avail at the trial level, defense counsel raised Fifth Amendment selfincrimination and Sixth Amendment assistance of counsel challenges. See id. at 220.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, withoutjust compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

The Wade Court observed:
(T]he accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the
State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or
out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right
to a fair trial. The security of that right is as much the aim of the right
to counsel as it is of the other guarantees of the Sixth Amendmentthe right of the accused to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury, his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,
and his right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.
Id. at 226-27 (footnotes omitted). But see Stephen A. Saltzburg, Criminal Procedure in
the 1960s: A Reality Check, 42 DRAKE L. REv. 179, 199-200 (1993) (claiming that the
Court identified a key problem, but chose the wrong solution in merely requiring the
presence of counsel at a lineup).
52
Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.
53 See id. at 236-37. The Court explored the following
drawbacks associated with
eyewitness identification: (1) the fallibility associated with identifying strangers, (2)
the suggestiveness commonly associated with pretrial identification procedures, (3)
witnesses' susceptibility to even subtle suggestion, (4) witnesses' documented
unwillingness to change their minds once an identification has been made, (5) a
victim's outrage interfering with objective identification, and (6) the inability of the
accused to effectively undermine the credibility of the identification by proving any
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vacated the defendant's conviction and ordered a hearing to explore
(1) whether the eyewitnesses' in-court identifications of the
defendant were based on valid, independent observations and (2)
whether including such evidence prejudiced the defendant. 4
5 also involved a pretrial lineup conducted in
Gilbert v. California"
the absence of defense counsel. 6 The Supreme Court addressed not
only the trial court's need to determine that in-court identifications
are "not tainted by the illegal lineup,

'57

but also ruled on the

admissibility of direct testimony regarding an identification at an
illegal lineup.5 The Court applied its ruling in Wade by holding that,
for the conviction to stand, the State must establish either (1) that
the in-court identification has a source other than the illegal lineup
or (2) that admitting the evidence does not prejudice the
defendant. 5" Going one step further than Wade, however, the Court
held that direct testimony regarding the identification at an illegal
lineup is per se inadmissible.60 The Court reasoned that a steadfast
exclusionary rule against "illegal lineup" testimony would underscore
the importance of the lineup stage and provide law enforcement
personnel with an added incentive to act in accordance with a
criminal defendant's constitutional right to have counsel present at
lineup.6'

unfairness during a private lineup confrontation. See id. at 228-32.
54 See id. at 242.
55 388 U.S. 263 (1967).

% See Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 269. The case involved an armed robbery of a California
loan and savings establishment, as well as the murder of a law enforcement officer at
the scene. See id. at 265. Defendant was initially arrested by the FBI in Philadelphia.
See id. at 265-66. Without notice to defense counsel, the alleged perpetrator was
paraded with 10 to 13 prisoners on a stage in a Los Angeles auditorium before more
than 100 people in the audience. See id. at 270 & n.2. The men in the lineup were
asked questions and directed to utter phrases used by the perpetrator during the
robbery. See id. at 270 n.2. Defendant was identified by three eyewitnesses to the
robbery in question, the manager of the apartment building where evidence was
discovered, and eight witnesses of other crimes allegedly committed by him. See id. at
269-70. A bifurcated trial ultimately resulted in imposition of the death penalty. See
id. at 265.
57 Id. at
272.
See id. at 272-73.
See id. at 272.
60 See id. at 273.
61 See id. at 273 ("Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony
can be an
effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the
accused's constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup." ).
The Court further reasoned that "the desirability of deterring the constitutionally
objectionable practice must prevail over the undesirability of excluding relevant
evidence." Id.
5

1238

SETON HALL LA WREVEW

[Vol. 30:1224

In Stovall v. Denno,62 the Court considered whether the
exclusionary rules enunciated in Wade and Gilbert should be applied
retroactively.63 The Court additionally considered whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, the identification procedure was so
unnecessarily conducive to misidentification that the accused
suffered a violation of due process.64 In Stovall, the defendant had
not yet had the opportunity to retain counsel when the police
brought him to the stabbing victim's hospital room for identification
purposes.6
At trial, the victim testified about the identification
process at the hospital, made an in-court identification, and the
defendant was convicted.6 Following his conviction, the defendant
filed for federal habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of
his forced participation in an unfairly suggestive showup without the
benefit of legal representation.67 Although acknowledging that the
exclusionary rules announced in Wade and Gilbert sought to secure
justice and ensure accurate identifications, the Court held that
"adherence to sound principles of decision-making" militated against
retroactive application of the rules. 8 The Court explained that
showing suspects individually for identification purposes is generally
discouraged, but the particularly crisis-like circumstances of the case'
did not permit a formal lineup and, thus, petitioner had not been
denied due process of law. 7
62
0

388 U.S. 293 (1967).
See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297.

64 See id. at 301-02.

See id. at 295. A physician was stabbed to death in his Long Island home. See
id. His wife, also a doctor, was stabbed 11 times by the attacker. See id. At the crime

scene, police found a shirt and keys, which were ultimately traced to defendant. See
id. Without waiting for counsel to be appointed, police brought the accused to the
hospital for identification purposes. See id. The female victim identified defendant
from her hospital bed after the man uttered words for voice recognition. See id.
See id.
See id. at 295-96.
Id. at 301; see also id. at 297. The Court acknowledged that "[i] nequity arguably
results from according the benefit of a new rule to the parties in the case in which it
is announced but not to other litigants similarly situated in the trial or appellate
process who have raised the same issue." Id. at 301. The Court supported its ruling
66

67

by reasoning, "we regard that fact that the parties involved are chance beneficiaries
as an insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles of decision-making." Id.
69See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302. The emergent circumstances justifying the showup
procedure included that the victim was potentially close to death and thus, a showup
may have been the defendant's only chance to clear his name. See id.
70 See id. at 302.
Specifically, the Court explained that the following factors
demonstrated the need for a showup at the hospital: (1) the victim was the only one
who could positively identify or exculpate the accused, (2) time may have been a
factor because her survival was not certain, (3) the victim was unable to travel to the
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Five years later, in Neil v. Biggers," the United States Supreme
Court set forth factors for assessing the reliability of eyewitness
identification following a suggestive showup." In Neil, the accused
was convicted of rape based on the victim's identification during a
showup procedure conducted approximately seven months after the
attack." The Court acknowledged that an increased chance of
misidentification can violate a defendant's due process rights, but
ultimately concluded that an unnecessarily suggestive identification
procedure alone does not warrant the exclusion of such evidence. 4
The Court evaluated the reliability of the identification under the
totality of the circumstances, but focused on the following factors:
(1) the witness's opportunity to observe the defendant at the time of
the criminal act, (2) the attention of the witness, (3) the precision of
the witness's earlier description of the perpetrator, (4) the degree of
certainty shown by the witness at the time of identification, and (5)
the amount of time between the criminal act and the confrontation."
Applying these five factors, the Court held that misidentification of
the assailant was not a 6substantial likelihood and, thus, the case
properly went to the jury.

police station, and (4) the police pursued the only feasible avenue for identification.
See id.
71 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
See Nei4 409 U.S. at 199-200.
73 See id. at 189, 194-95. The victim's testimony detailed
an attack in her kitchen
by a youth wielding a butcher knife. See id. at 193. The intruder initially wrestled the
victim to the floor, but when the victim's daughter began screaming, the perpetrator
forced the victim at knifepoint to walk outside along train tracks into a wooded
setting. See id. at 193-94. At this location, the assailant committed rape under what
the victim described as brightly moonlit conditions. See id. at 194. After the attack,
the perpetrator fled the scene, and the victim returned home to contact the police.
See id. The victim relayed a general description of the assailant to the police and
viewed suspects (i.e., lineups, showups, and pictures) for the next seven months. See
id. at 194-95. Finally, a showup was conducted during which the victim maintained
having "no doubt" about the positive identification of the attacker. See id. at 195.
74 See id. at 198-99. The Court specifically stated that "the admission of evidence
of a showup without more does not violate due process .... While we are inclined to
agree with the courts below that the police did not exhaust all possibilities in seeking
persons physically comparable to respondent, we do not think that the evidence
must therefore be excluded." Id.
75 See id. at 199-200. The Neil Court found that the victim: (1) spent a substantial
amount of time observing her attacker under lighted conditions, (2) was by no
means a casual observer, (3) provided a thorough description of the assailant, (4)
did not contradict herself with any other identifications, and (5) acted quite certain
as to her identification. See id. at 200-01.
76 See id. at 201.
Applying the elements five years later, the United States
Supreme Court alluded to the possible unreliability of cross-racial identification in
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). See Manson, 432 U.S. at 115. Reflecting
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A further safeguard against the inaccuracy of eyewitness
identification is the model jury instruction formulated in the 1972
decision of United States v. Telfaire. In that case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered whether a
jury may deliberate the guilt of an accused based solely upon the
uncorroborated testimony of one witness. 7 Although the case hinged
on the issue of eyewitness identification with the accused denying any
part in the robbery, the trial court did not issue a specific charge on
identification. 7 The court of appeals held that (1) because of the
particular circumstances of the case " and the jury charge actually
given,8 ' the jurors' attention was sufficiently focused on the issue of
identification and (2) the defense was not prejudiced by the absence
of a charge specific to identification. 2 In view of Wade and its
progeny, however, the court crafted a model instruction 3 that could
upon a same-race identification of a Connecticut drug dealer by an African-American
undercover narcotics officer, the Court noted that the officer, as a member of the
same race, is "unlikely to perceive only general features of 'hundreds of Hartford
black males.'" Manson, 432 U.S. at 115 (quoting Brathwaite v. Manson, 527 F.2d 363,
371 (2d Cir. 1975)).
77 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
78 See Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 554-55. The "one witness rule" allows
a case to qualify
for jury deliberation on uncorroborated testimony of a solitary witness. See id. at 554.
The victim in Telfaire recounted a scenario occurring in a hotel during which he was
robbed of ten dollars. See id. at 554 n.4. More than one-half hour later, the victim
was accompanied by two officers back to the hotel, where he identified the accused
as the robber. See id.
79 See id. at 555-56.
The court noted that the importance of a special jury
instruction on finding the evidence supporting identification beyond a reasonable
doubt was articulated first in McKenzie v. United States, 126 F.2d 533, 536 (D.C. Cir.
1942). See Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 555.
80 See Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 556-57. The victim had a sufficient opportunity
to view
the perpetrator and automatically identified the defendant upon seeing him in the
hotel lobby. See id. at 555 n.4.
81 See id. at 556. The jury instructions covered aspects of
reasonable doubt,
elements of the offense, and alibi. See id.
82 See id. at 556 & n.13.
83 See id. at 555 n.11, 558-59. In pertinent part, the
model jury instruction
provides:
One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of
the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The Government has
the burden of providing identity, beyond a reasonable doubt ...
However, you, the jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of
the accuracy of the identification of the defendant before you may
convict him....
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by
the witness. Its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to
observe the offender at the time of the offense and to make a reliable
identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should
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be used in cases warranting a specific charge on eyewitness
identification."' The court explained that the instruction was not
mandatory, but strongly encouraged the use of the instruction in
future criminal trials.85
Much like the federal courts, the New Jersey judiciary has taken86
notice of the misidentification risk posed by eyewitness testimony.
In State v. Green, 7 for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court
consider the following:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and
an adequate opportunity to observe the offender?
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by the
witness subsequent to the offense was the product of his own
recollection?....
[(3) You may take into account any occasions in which the
witness failed to make an identification of defendant, or made
an identification that was inconsistent with his identification at
trial.]
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each
identification witness in the same way as any other witness ....
Id. at 558-59 (brackets in original).
At least one commentator, however, has suggested that the Telfaire instruction
may not appropriately sensitize jurors to eyewitness evidence. See RobertJ. Hallisey,
Experts on Eyewitness Testimony in Court-A Short HistoricalPerspective, 39 HoW. L.J. 237,
265 (1995) (discussing results of an experiment indicating that a judge's Telfaire
instructions failed to sensitize jurors to eyewitness evidence or to create any
skepticism with whichjurors viewed the evidence).
See Telfaire, 469 F.2d. at 557.
85 See id. The Telfaire court stated that "[the model jury instruction]
is not being
set forth in terms of compulsion, but a failure to use this model, with appropriate
adaptations, would constitute a risk in future cases that should not be ignored unless
there is strong reason in the particular case." Id.
SeeState v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 292, 430 A.2d 914, 919 (1981). An accused has
a right to rely on the assumption that basic principles upon which the accusation
against him is based will be covered in the jury charge. See State v. Butler, 27 N.J.
560, 596, 143 A.2d 530, 550 (1958). The right to a properjury charge is absolute. See
id.
Charging the jury in a proper manner is crucial to a fair trial. See Gabriel v. Auf
Der Heidearagona, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 558, 563-65, 82 A.2d 644, 647-48 (App. Div.
1951). A jury charge instructs the jurors as to the issues of law involved in the
decision-making process. See Green, 86 N.J. at 288, 430 A.2d at 917. Jury instructions
may be classified into three categories: (1) essential and fundamental issues, (2)
substantially material matters, and (3) other relevant and material topics. See id. at
289, 430 A.2d at 918. The court should instruct the jury as to essential or
substantially material elements. See id. at 290, 430 A.2d at 918. Failure to grant
prog er requests will be deemed prejudicial error. See id. at 291, 430 A.2d at 919.
86 N.J. 281, 430 A.2d 914 (1981). The underlying facts of the case involved a
woman approached by a strange man asking for a match at about 12:30 a.m. in
Newark, New Jersey. See id. at 285, 430 A.2d at 915-16. The man asked her what her
astrological sign was and stated that he was born under the sign of Leo. See id., 430
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reversed a rape and robbery conviction because of the trial court's
failure to issue a jury charge specific to eyewitness identification.m
The court emphasized that the potential for mistaken identification
was magnified because the victim's eyewitness testimony was the crux
of the case. " The court concluded that, when identification of the
defendant is a critical issue, a specific instruction is required to focus
juror attention on the proper manner by which eyewitness testimony
should be evaluated.9
Nearly a decade later, in State v. Gunter, the New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division, considered whether a defendant is further
entitled to present expert testimony on eyewitness identification. 9' In
Gunter, a robbery and aggravated assault case, an expert witness for
the defendant was prepared to state that cross-racial identifications
Applying New
are less reliable than same-race identifications.2
A.2d at 916. Subsequently, he forced her toward a school yard by holding a razor to
her neck. See id. at 285-86, 430 A.2d at 916. He then took money from her and
raped her in an alley. See id. at 286, 430 A.2d at 916. Several months later, she
identified the defendant after seeing him in a bar. See id. Defendant did not match
the original description that the victim gave police, but he admitted being a "Leo,"
using a box cutter at his job, and living in the neighborhood where the crime
occurred. See id. at 286-87, 430 A.2d at 916.
88 See id. at 292, 294, 430 A.2d at 919, 921.
See id. at 291, 430 A.2d at 919 ("The absence of any eyewitness other than [the
victim] directly connecting defendant to the crime, the discrepancies in the
description, and defendant's denial combined to make identification a fundamental
and essential trial issue. The potential danger of mistaken eyewitness identification is
particularly significant here.").
90 See id. at 292, 430 A.2d at 919. The New Jersey Supreme Court listed two
alternatives that would satisfy the requirement of a jury charge: (1) the trial court
could have clarified that the burden of proof to establish that the defendant raped
the victim rested with the State, or (2) the trial court could have issued the Model
Jury Charge on identification. See id. at 293, 430 A.2d at 920.
q1 See State v. Gunter, 231 N.J. Super. 34, 554 A.2d 1356
(App. Div. 1989).
See id. at 36, 40-41, 554 A.2d at 1357, 1359-60. This case involved a robbery of a
McDonald's restaurant by two masked individuals. See id. at 37, 554 A.2d at 1357.
While the night manager was locking up the restaurant, one of the intruders forced
three employees into a freezer. See id., 554 A.2d at 1357-58. The other intruder
forced the manager, at gunpoint, to fill a bag with money. See id., 554 A.2d at 1358.
The manager was able to see the face of one robber who had adjusted his mask. See
id. When the robber realized that the manager was looking at his face, he hit him
across the face with a pistol. See id. After the bag was filled, the robber forced the
manager into the freezer with the other employees. See id. The manager's
subsequent identification of the defendant, two stocking masks, and a weapon were
the only pieces of evidence linking the accused to the crime. See id. at 38-39, 554
A.2d at 1358.
The defendant was prepared to introduce an expert, who was prepared to testify
that white people are less apt to distinguish accurately among black people than viceversa. See id. at 41, 554 A.2d at 1360. The expert was also prepared to explain the
.weapon focus" theory, which involves the limitations of a victim's perceptions when
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Jersey's evidentiary rules, the appellate division held that the
exclusion of the expert testimony was erroneous in the absence of an
admissibility hearing. "" The court further noted that the New Jersey
Rules of Evidence require the trial judge to consider the nature and
reliability of the expert testimony, as well as the witness's expertise."

an attacker has a deadly weapon. See id. Furthermore, the expert was prepared to
explain the "forgetting curve" (i.e., recollection of an event does not diminish at a
steady rate) and the degree to which memory factors are commonly understood or
misunderstood. See id.
The court noted that, although several state and federal courts had previously
addressed the issue of expert testimony on eyewitness identification, New Jersey had
not yet considered the issue in a published court opinion. See id. at 36, 554 A.2d at
1357.
93 See id. Rule 8 of the NewJersey Rules of Evidence provides, in pertinent
part:
(1) When the qualification of a person to be a witness, or the
admissibility of evidence, or the existence of a privilege is stated in
these rules to be subject to a condition, and the fulfillment of the
condition is in issue, that issue is to be determined by the judge....
(2) Where evidence is otherwise admissible if relevant and its relevance
is subject to a condition, the judge shall admit it if there is sufficient
evidence to support a finding of the condition. In such cases the judge
shall instruct the jury to consider the issue of the fulfillment of the
condition and to disregard the evidence if they find that the condition
was not fulfilled....
(3) Where by virtue of any rule of law ajudge is required in a criminal
action to make a preliminary determination as to the admissibility of a
statement by the defendant, the judge shall hear and determine the
question of its admissibility out of the presence of the jury. In such a
hearing the rules of evidence shall apply and the burden of proof as to
admissibility of the statement is on the prosecution....
N.J. R. EVID. 8.
See Gunter, 231 N.J. Super. at 41-42, 554 A.2d at 1360 (citing State v. Kelly, 97
N.J. 178, 208, 478 A.2d 364, 379 (1984)). The three factors included: (1) whether
the testimony addresses aspects beyond the common understanding of jurors, (2)
whether the area of testimony is sufficiently advanced such that the information is
reliable, and (3) whether the purported expert has sufficient expertise to lend a
reliable account. See id. These three factors are taken from Rule 56(2), which
provides:
A witness qualified pursuant to Rule 19 as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training or education may testify in the form of
opinion or otherwise as to matters requiring scientific, technical or
other specialized knowledge if such testimony will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. The facts or
data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,
the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
NJ. R. EVD. 56(2).
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Recently, in State v. Cromedy,"5 the New Jersey Supreme Court
considered a particular type of eyewitness testimony-cross-racial
identification. 9 The court ruled that ajury instruction on cross-racial
identification is mandatory in certain instances, despite a lack of
consensus in the scientific community as to the reliability of the
theory of cross-racial recognition impairment.9 7
Justice Coleman, writing for a unanimous court, began by
acknowledging that the issue of cross-racial identification impairment
was one of first impression in NewJersey.9s The justice stated that the
determinative question is whether a cross-racial jury charge should be
issued even though expert testimony on the matter of identification
was not presented at trial."q Considering the propriety of a special
jury instruction, the court reflected upon empirical research
examining
the
psychological
determinants
of cross-racial
identification reliability.l°°
The court explained that some

95

158 N.J. 112, 727A.2d 457 (1999).
See id. at 115, 727 A.2d at 458. Defendant argued that cross-racial
impairment

is a scientific reality and, furthermore, that the court should take judicial notice of
such fallibility and approve the findings of the NewJersey Supreme Court Task Force
on Minority Concerns, recommending a jury instruction. See id. at 119, 727 A.2d at
460-61. Defendant relied on the Task Force's report, common knowledge, and
judicial notice to bolster his argument and further maintained that expert testimony
would not assist the jury in itsdetermination. See id. at 119-20, 727 A.2d at 461.
Alternatively, the State argued that there is no definitive determination in the
scientific community as to cross-racial impairment and that the court therefore
should decline to issue ajury charge. See id.
97 See id. at 130, 727 A.2d at 466 ("We reject the State's contention
that we should
not require a cross-racial identification charge before it has been demonstrated that
there is substantial agreement in the relevant scientific community that cross-racial
recognition impairment is significant enough to support the need for such a
charge."). The court then defined the appropriate circumstances for a cross-racial
instruction. See id. at 132, 727 A.2d at 467 ("A cross-racial instruction should be given
only when ... identification is a critical issue in the case, and an eyewitness's crossracial identification is not corroborated by other evidence giving it independent
reliability.").
See id. at 120, 727 A.2d at 461. The justice described cross-racial identification
as occurring "when an eyewitness is asked to identify a person of another race." Id.
99 See id. ("In this context, we must decide whether a
cross-racial jury instruction
should be required where scientific evidence demonstrating the need for a specific
instruction has not been presented.").
100 See id. at 120-23, 727 A.2d at 461-62. The court took notice of
the increasing
frequency with which findings of cross-racial recognition can be found in the
professional literature. See id. at 120, 727 A.2d at 461. One study found that jurors
place significant weight on eyewitness identification, even to the extent that they may
blatantly disregard exculpatory evidence. See id. at 120-21, 727 A.2d at 461 (citing
R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Can People Detect Eyewitness-Identification Accuracy Within and
Across Situations?, 66J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79, 79-89 (1981)). Other studies have shown
that eyewitnesses are better at identifying members of their own race than members
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eyewitnesses are affected by "own-race" bias-a decreased ability to
accurately identify members of another race.' ° The court then
highlighted the consistency with which studies have found "that the
'own-race effect' is 'strongest when white witnesses attempt to
recognize black subjects." 0

2

The court also noted, however, that

significant disagreement remains within the scientific community
over (1) the actual impact of the "own-race" bias upon eyewitness
reliability, (2) the degree to which members of different races are
affected by cross-racial impairment, and (3) the extent to which
empirical findings can be applied to real-life situations.'0 '
The court maintained that agreement among researchers in a
particular area is not a sine qua non of judicial reliance upon research
in that same area. 0 4 In support of this proposition, the court
submitted that the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education'0 5 did not consider the uniformity of social scientists'
opinions to be a prerequisite for buttressing legal conclusions with
research findings.'0 6 Justice Coleman reasoned that sociological
observations can aid a court in choosing a rule of law, as exemplified
by the Brown Court's reliance upon social science studies finding that
racial segregation had a harmful effect upon students. °7
Justice Coleman then embarked upon a review of federal
precedent that revealed a trend of increasing attention to eyewitness

See id. at 121, 727 A.2d at 461 (citing ELIZABETH F. LoFrus,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus, supra note 6, at 1of other races.

11).

See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 121, 727 A.2d at 461.
Id., 727 A.2d at 461-62 (quoting People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 720 (Cal.
1984)).
103 See id. at 121-23, 727 A.2d at 461-62.
The court stated that "[a]lthough
researchers generally agree that some eyewitnesses exhibit an own-race bias, they
disagree about the degree to which own-race bias affects identification." Id. at 121,
727 A.2d at 462.
101

1

10

See id. at 123, 727 A.2d at 462-63.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
106 See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 123, 727 A.2d at 462-63. The court stated:
The debate among researchers did not prevent the Supreme Court
of the United States, in the famous school desegregation case of Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka, from using behavioral and social
sciences to support legal conclusions without requiring that the
methodology employed by those scientists have general acceptance in
the scientific community.
Id., 727 A.2d at 462 (citations omitted).
107 See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 123, 727 A.2d at 462-63 ("Thus, Brown v.
Board of
Education is the prototypical example of an appellate court using modern social and
behavioral sciences as legislative evidence to support its choice of a rule of law.").
105
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identification pitfalls.""' The court noted passages from various courts
of appeals decisions during the past several decades that
demonstrated judicial encouragement of jury charges that focus
attention on the suspect nature of eyewitness identifications.'O°
Justice Coleman also took notice of the United States Supreme
Court's warnings about the unreliability of eyewitness identifications
and the likelihood of race as a complicating factor."
Having considered the federal approach to eyewitness
identification, the justice focused on cross-racial jury charges in state
courts."' The court observed that judicial treatment of cross-racial
jury instructions has ranged from discretionary use to complete
prohibition.1 2 Justice Coleman reported that the majority of courts
that allow cross-racial instructions leave the decision to provide such
charges to the trial judge's discretion."' The justice stated that, in
See id. at 124-25, 727 A.2d at 463-64. The justice explored federal treatment
of
eyewitness identification overall, as well as cross-racial identification, in particular.
See id. (discussing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967);Jackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Smith, 563 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977) (Hufstedler, J., concurring); United States v.
Russell, 532 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Brown, 461 F.2d 134 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring)).
"oq See id. (quotingJackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d 108, 112 (2d
Cir. 1978) ("[C]enturies
of experience in the administration of criminal justice have shown that convictions
based solely on testimony that identifies a defendant previously unknown to the
witness is highly suspect. Of all the various kinds of evidence it is the least reliable,
especially where unsupported by corroborating evidence.")); United States v. Smith,
563 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1977) (Hufstedler, J., concurring) (commenting on
the reliability of eyewitness identification as being "at best, highly dubious, given the
extensive empirical evidence that eyewitness identifications are not reliable.");
United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (6th Cir. 1976)). In Russell, Judge
McCree stated:
There is a great potential for misidentification when a witness
identifies a stranger based solely upon a single brief observation, and
this risk is increased when the observation was made at a time of stress
or excitement....
108

This problem is important because of all the evidence that may be
presented to ajury, a witness' in-court statement that "he is the one" is
probably the most dramatic and persuasive.
Russell 532 F.2d at 1066-67.
11 See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 125, 727 A.2d at 464 (quoting United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) ("The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known;
the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.")).
I See id. at 126-28, 727 A.2d at 464-65. The justice cited to case law of California,
Massachusetts, Utah, Kansas, New York, Illinois, and Rhode Island while considering
the utility of cross-racial identification instructions. See id.
112 See

id.

11s See id. at 126, 727 A.2d at 464 (citing several cases that illustrate the
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these "discretionary" jurisdictions, a trial court's failure to issue a
cross-racial cautionary charge is considered prejudicial error only
when (1) eyewitness identification is a central issue, (2) no other
corroborating evidence exists, and (3) factors arise that cast doubt
upon the reliability of the identification." 4
Conversely, the justice noted that some courts refuse to issue
cross-racial jury instructions under any circumstances."5 The justice
explained that some of these courts have reasoned both that crossracial instructions require expert testimony and that crossexamination, coupled with summation, sufficiently safeguards against
the risk of misidentification.1 16 The justice also remarked that other
courts refusing to give cross-racial jury instructions have
concluded
7
that empirical findings on the topic are questionable.1
Having reviewed the law in other jurisdictions, Justice Coleman
turned to New Jersey jurisprudence." 8 The justice emphasized that
NewJersey law already requires a trial court to give ajury instruction
specific to eyewitness identification when it is a crucial issue in the
discretionary approach, including Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1168 (Mass.
1995), People v. Wright, 755 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1988), State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah
1986), People v. Palmer,203 Cal. Rptr. 474 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), and People v. West, 189
Cal. Rptr. 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)).
The justice then turned to case law of other jurisdictions holding that crossracial identification is an inappropriatesubject for a jury charge and relying, instead,
on expert guidance, cross-examination, and summation to safeguard against
misidentifications. See id. at 127, 727 A.2d at 465 (citing State v. Willis, 731 P.2d 287
(Kan. 1987); People v. McDaniel, 630 N.Y.S.2d 112 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)). The
court further mentioned alternate jurisdictional views denying cross-racial
instructions on grounds such as questionable empirical findings and "instructions as
improper commentary on 'the nature and quality' of the evidence." Id. (quoting
State v. Hadrick, 523 A.2d 441, 444 (R.I. 1987)).
114 See id. The court also noted that refusal to give the cross-racial
instruction, in
these same jurisdictions, is deemed proper in situations in which the victim was able
to view the perpetrator under adequate observational conditions, additional
corroborating evidence exists, and racial components apparently do not affect the
identification. See id. at 127 (citing Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d at 1171).
15
See id. at 127, 727 A.2d at 465 ("A number of courts have concluded
that crossracial identification simply is not an appropriate topic for jury instruction.") (citing
State v. Willis, 731 P.2d 287 (Kan. 1987); Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1168
(Mass. 1995); People v. McDaniel, 630 N.Y.S.2d 112 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)).
116 See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 127, 727 A.2d at 465 ("Those courts have determined
that the cross-racial instruction requires expert guidance, and that cross-examination
and summation are adequate safeguards to highlight unreliable identifications.").
117 See id.
(citing United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Leventhal,J., concurring); People v. Bias, 475 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)).
118 See id. at 128, 727 A.2d at 465 (citing State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281,
292, 430 A.2d
914, 919 (1981); State v. Melvin, 65 N.J. 1, 18, 319 A.2d 450, 459 (1974); State v.
Middleton, 299 N.J. Super. 22, 32, 690 A.2d 623, 628 (App. Div. 1997); State v. Frey,
194 N.J. Super. 326, 329-30, 476 A.2d 884, 885 (App. Div. 1984)).
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case."" Justice Coleman reviewed State v. Green,2 1 in which the court
held that a proper eyewitness identification instruction should direct
the jury to consider "the capacity or the ability of the witness to make
observations or perceptions . . . at the time and under all of the

attendant circumstances for seeing that which he says he saw or that
which he says he perceived with regard to his identification." 2' The
justice underscored the applicability of the Green decision to the case
at bar by remarking that Cromedy had sought a jury charge focusing
on the cross-racial identification as one
of the "attendant
22
circumstances" of the witness's observation.1
Justice Coleman next reviewed the findings of the New Jersey
Supreme Court Task Force on Minority Concerns. 2 3 The court
summarized the Task Force's final report as recommending that the
New Jersey Supreme Court assume a proactive stance on the issue of
cross-racial identification by developing a special jury charge. 2 4 The
court further noted that the Task Force's five-year effort culminated
in a final version of a cross-racial jury instruction that was submitted
2 5
to the Model CriminalJury Charge Committee for consideration.
"19 See id. ("[T]he trial court is obligated to give
the jury a discrete and specific
instruction that provides appropriate guidelines to focus the jury's attention on how
to analyze and consider the trustworthiness of eyewitness identification.").
:2
86 N.J. 281, 430 A.2d 914 (1981).
2
Id. at 293-94, 430 A.2d at 920.
1
See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 128, 727 A.2d at 465.
123 See id. at 128-30, 727 A.2d at 465-66. The Task Force
consisted of "an appellate
judge, trial judges, lawyers representing both the prosecution and defense, social
scientists, and ordinary citizens." Id. at 128-29, 727 A.2d at 465.
14 See id. at 129, 727 A.2d at 465-66 ("Ultimately,
in 1992 the Task Force
submitted its final report to the Court in which it recommended, among other
things, that the Court develop a special jury charge regarding the unreliability of
cross-racial identifications."). The court subsequently forwarded the Task Force's
recommendation to the Criminal Practice Committee. See id. at 129, 727 A.2d at 466.
A subcommittee drafted a proposed charge that read as follows:
You know that the identifying witness is of a different race than the
defendant. When a witness, who is a member of one race, identifies a
defendant, who is a member of another race, we say that there has
been a cross-racial identification. You may consider, if you think it is
appropriate to do so, whether the cross-racial nature of the
identification has affected the accuracy of the witness' [sic] original
perception and/or the accuracy of the subsequent identification (s).
Id. (correction in original).
125 See id. at 129-30, 727 A.2d at 466. The final proposed
"cross-racial factor" read:
"The fact that the witness is not of the same race as the perpetrator and/or
defendant and whether that fact might have had an impact on the witness' [sic]
ability to make an accurate identification." Id. at 130, 727 A.2d at 466 (correction in
original). The Model Criminal Jury Charge Committee reserved decision on the
proposal pending the outcome of the Cromedy case. See id.
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Turning to the facts of the case before it, the Cromedy court flatly
rejected the State's argument that cross-racial identifications should
not be required until the research community reaches a consensus
on the significance of cross-racial impairment. 26 Justice Coleman
responded that the jury instruction at issue related merely to
experience within the purview of a common juror and, thus, did not
require any scientific knowledge.' 27 The justice further stated that, in
the requested jury instruction, the defendant had characterized the
racial component of the identification as a factor bearing 28on
eyewitness reliability in much the same way as visibility conditions.'
Crowning its thorough consideration of federal and state case
law, empirical research, New Jersey jurisprudence, and the Task
Force's findings, the court handed down a carefully circumscribed
holding. The court held that a cross-racial identification requires a
special jury charge when (1) identification is a central issue and (2)
there is no corroborating evidence of the identification. 30 In the case
at bar, Justice Coleman specifically noted that eyewitness
identification was a central issue, the identification was not supported
by any other independent evidence, and the identification occurred
almost eight months after the attack.'' Based upon these facts, the
New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the trial court committed
reversible error when it refused to issue Cromedy's requested
instruction for the jury to weigh the potential cross-racial impact
against the accuracy of the identification.' 32 Furthermore, the court
126

See id.

127 See

id.

("[Defendant] relied ... on ordinary human experience and the

legislative-type findings of the Task Force because the basis for his request [for a jury
instruction] did not involve a matter that was beyond the ken of the average juror.").
128 See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 130-31, 727
A.2d at 466 ("Defendant requested a crossracial identification jury instruction that would treat the racial character of the
eyewitness identification as one of the factors bearing on its reliability in much the
same way as lighting and proximity to the perpetrator at the time of the offense.").
1
See id. at 131, 727 A.2d at 467 ("[W]e hold that a cross-racial identification, as a
subset of eyewitness identification, requires a special jury instruction in an
appropriate case.").
. See id. at 132, 727 A.2d at 467. The court was careful to limit the use of a crossracial jury instruction. See id. ("The simple fact pattern of a white victim of a violent
crime at the hands of a black assailant would not automatically give rise to the need
for a cross-racial identification charge. More is required.").
IIISee id.
212

See id. at 132-33, 727 A.2d at 467, stating:
We conclude, therefore, that it was reversible error not to have given
an instruction that informed the jury about the possible significance of
the cross-racial identification factor, a factor the jury can observe in
many cases with its own eyes, in determining the critical issue-the
accuracy of the identification.
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held that expert testimony was inadmissible due to the
"commonsense" nature of the notion that individuals have greater
difficulty identifying members of another race than a member of
their own race.""" Accordingly, the court reversed the appellate
division's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.'"
The eyewitness identification of a perpetrator who faces serious
criminal sanctions merits careful scrutiny.
In Cromedy, the
defendant's conviction turned solely on a victim's eight-month-old
recollection

of a stranger. 1,

The court's concern

about the

unreliability associated with cross-racial recognition was on targetMcKinley Cromedy ultimately was exonerated by a DNA test after
spending more than six years in prison.'6 Even absent the unique
circumstances of Cromedy's case, requiring a cross-racial jury
instruction seems prudent in light of scientific research, the
recommendations of the Task Force on Minority Concerns, and case
law in other jurisdictions.3 The Cromedy decision may also signal an
Id.

Is.See id. at 133, 727 A.2d at 467-68.
IM See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 133, 727 A.2d at 468.
'1
See id. at 117, 727 A.2d at 459.
"M See Smothers, supra note 32, at B6. Cromedy faced
a 50-year sentence for the
rape conviction. See id. After serving approximately six years of the sentence, DNA
test results from the NewJersey State Police crime laboratory exonerated Cromedy as
the perpetrator. See id. Such testing is currently accepted to be as reliable as
fingerprinting. See id.
7 See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 131, 727 A.2d at 467. By its very nature,
however, a
cross-racial jury instruction is ironic in view of the working premise that the United
States Constitution is color-blind. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens.").
Similarly, there is an irony when considering a cross-racial identification jury
charge in light of constitutional restrictions on juror selection; the same jury that is
instructed to consider cross-racial bias in identifications cannot itself be the product
of racial bias. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). In Batson, the United
States Supreme Court held that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor
to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption
that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case
against a black defendant." Id. But see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and
the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 1016, 1022-23 (1988) (discussing the practical
obstacles that a defendant must face to gain relief from discriminatory application of
preemptory challenges and noting that allowing defendants to challenge
discriminatory use of preemptory challenges will not eviscerate discriminatory juror
selection).
Another interesting racial component of a trial involves the composition of the
jury; for example, the Cromedy jury included 11 Caucasians and a single AfricanAmerican. See Smothers, supra note 32, at B6. Research findings suggest that white
jury members are more apt to convict African-American defendants than Caucasian
defendants, under similar circumstances. See Miller & Mauet, supra note 7, at 552.
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end to the hesitancy that historically has been a hallmark of the legal
system's treatment of behavioral and social science research.'"
Furthermore, the Cromedy holding properly takes into account that
(1) jurors have a tendency to attribute significant weight to
eyewitness testimony irrespective of other salient factors, 9 and (2) a
jury instruction is a more economical route than is expert
testimony.' 4°
The apparent simplicity of the Cromedy decision, however, veils
weighty concerns. In certain instances, a jury instruction on crossracial identification may prove to be ineffective, superfluous, or even
unjust.
The stated goal of the New Jersey Supreme Court-to safeguard
against grievous miscarriages of justice due to mistaken
identifications--does not seem to comport with the final product,
which merely requires a jury instruction. In light of the various
options available to the court in Cromedy, a cautionary jury charge
may not be the optimal way to prevent mistaken identifications
resulting in wrongful convictions.14 ' The degree to which jurors
absorb and comprehend judges' instructions is unclear due to both
procedural factors and psychological variables specific to jury
members. 42 Research findings on the shortcomings of jury charges
These findings also point to the possibility that classifications based on races other
than Caucasian/African-American pairings may have similar discriminatory impact.
See id. at 552-53.
See ARNOLDS ET AL., supra note 3, § 1.04, at
6.
139 See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 120-21, 727 A.2d at 461 ("U]urors tend
to place great
'3

weight on eyewitness identifications, often ignoring other exculpatory evidence."); see
also Devenport & Penrod, supra note 4, at 348-49 (citing research findings that
indicate that jurors overestimate eyewitness accuracy, are unable to distinguish
between accurate and inaccurate testimony, and mistakenly rely on witness
confidence).
140 SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 974 ("[T]he need
for experts on the own-race
effect in many jurisdictions would be frequent and would therefore impose a greater
financial burden on the state than results from most kinds of expert testimony."
(footnote omitted)).
1
See Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 127, 727 A.2d at 465 (noting that other courts have
concluded that a cross-racial identification is not properly dealt with in the context of
ajury instruction).
142 See Sales et al., supra note 17, at 28, 30.
Regarding procedural factors, the
general practice of charging the jury at the conclusion of the case has received
significant criticism. See id. at 28. It has been suggested that charging jurors at the
beginning of the case would allow them to evaluate the evidence more properly in
terms of the applicable law. See id. In addition, that jurors are not allowed to take
the instructions with them when deliberating has also been criticized as placing too
much reliance on jurors' memories of crucial points. See id. at 29.
Regarding individual psychological variables, "[t]he extent to which a jury will
follow instructions will be determined by their willingness to do so and by the extent
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must not be minimized so as to yield the comfortable judicial
conclusion, or legal fiction, that an instruction will sufficiently focus
juror attention on the unreliability of cross-racial identifications. If
the New Jersey Supreme Court is truly concerned with mistaken
identifications, choosing a potentially ineffective remedy seems
counter-productive.
At a minimum, the Cromedy court could have accounted for the
possibility of an ineffective jury instruction by permitting expert
testimony in appropriate circumstances. Instead, the court chose to
institute a per se exclusionary rule on expert testimony concerning
cross-racial recognition impairment.143
The court specifically
disallowed expert testimony because of "the 'widely held
commonsense view that members of one race have greater difficulty
in accurately identifying members of a different race ,," 44 -thus
concluding that expert testimony on the topic would not assist the
jury in any meaningful way.145 The court's acknowledgement of the
widespread debate among researchers on cross-racial recognition

to which they have perceived, remembered, and comprehended the instructions."
Id. at 30; see also ARNOLDS ET AL., supra note 3, § 4.01, at 148 ("In eyewitness cases ....
the most important variable is the psychological make-up of the trier of fact."). It is
interesting to conceptualize jurors, themselves, as eyewitnesses to courtroom events
and, thus, as subject to all the drawbacks of reliability that affect eyewitnesses. See
ARNOLDS ET AL., supra note 3, § 4.01, at 148-49.
143 See Cromedy, 158 NJ. at 133,
727 A.2d at 467-68 (quoting United States v.
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, CJ., concurring)).
144 Id.
145 See id.
Although the court professes to rely upon the Task Force report, it
selectively incorporates some findings and ignores the Task Force findings that
indicate that cross-racial recognition impairment is not a matter of common
knowledge; judicial responses to a questionnaire revealed that only 47% of the
judges are aware of problems associated with cross-racial identifications. See New
Jersey Supreme Court Final Report of the Task Force on Minority Concerns, supra note 35, at
1145. The eighth finding of the report extrapolates: "While the Task Force does not
know with any certainty how familiar NewJersey's attorneys or prospective jurors may
be with the limitations of cross-racial eyewitness testimony, it is strongly suspected
that their respective knowledge bases are limited." Id. If more than half of the
judges questioned were unfamiliar with aspects of cross-racial identification, it seems
incredulous that the court would attribute such knowledge upon prospective jurors
and categorize cross-racial impairment as common sense. The existence of
misperceptions demonstrates a need for expert guidance, but the court failed to act
in accordance with such a proposition.
Reliance on juror common sense to assess witness credibility may be inaccurate,
and psychological data may assist in instances in which there is little or no
corroborating evidence of witness testimony. See Steven I. Friedland, On Common
Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 165, 225 (1990).
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impairment seems to contradict, rather
than support, the existence of
" 146
a "widely held commonsense view.
Alternatively, a cross-racial identification jury instruction may be
simply superfluous. 47 Viewed as a subset of eyewitness identification,
cross-racial recognition impairment may not warrant special mention
to the jury. Pattern jury instructions on eyewitness testimony in
general, coupled with cross-examination of eyewitnesses, arguably is
sufficient to alertjurors to the fallibility of eyewitness identification.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that an instruction will
focus juror attention on the unreliability of cross-racial
identifications, the potential exists for jury deliberation to be unduly
influenced. Instructing the jury on cross-racial identification in
addition to eyewitness identification results in a "double hit" on an
eyewitness account. In theory, an accurate eyewitness account should
withstand the added scrutiny of a specific instruction on cross-racial
identification. In reality, however, the jury might equate this second,
more specific reference to the inaccuracies of cross-racial
identifications with an almost "automatic" finding of reasonable
doubt' 4" and disregard the individual circumstances of the case.

146

Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 133, 727 A.2d at 467-68 (quoting Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 559

(Bazelon, C.J., concurring)).
147 See Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury
Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should)
Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 34 (1997) ("Perhaps the most important

thing to say about judicial instructions to juries is that, as practiced in the great
majority of American courts, they may be little more than a superfluous ritual.").
48 Reasonable doubt-the proof standard utilized in criminal
cases-is often not
defined for the jury. See Lieberman & Sales, supra note 11, at 597. Jurors'
understanding that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt is
distinct from an understanding of what, exactly, "reasonable doubt" means. See id.
Following this line of logic, there seems to be nothing to prevent a juror from
equating reasonable doubt with the fallacies inherent in eyewitness identification.
In addition, another potential problem of the Cromedy decision lies in the degree
of consistency with which trial courts will apply the rule of law in other factual
contexts. The court limited the use of a cross-racial identification only to cases in
which identification is a central issue and no other corroborating evidence exists. See
Cromedy, 158 N.J. at 132, 727 A.2d at 467. In an attempt to limit the use of a crossracial instruction to appropriate circumstances, the court ignores the possibility that
cross-racial recognition impairment may differ among races. Four studies, in fact,
indicate that African-Americans do not experience cross-racial recognition
impairment at all. See id. at 122, 727 A.2d at 462 (citing johnson, supra note 2, at
939). With its ruling, the court essentially has chosen sides in a battle of competing
research ideologies, ruling in accordance with findings suggesting that cross-racial
recognition impairment exists among all races and rejecting the possibility that races
are affected differently. If, in fact, African-American witnesses do not experience
cross-racial recognition impairment, no need exists for a cross-racial jury instruction
in a scenario similar in all respects to the Cromedy case, except to the extent that it
involves an African-American victim and a Caucasian perpetrator. The Cromedy
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Justice will not be served if jurors disregard an accurate eyewitness
identification on the basis of generalities associated with cross-racial
identification.
Overall, the Cromedy court was undeniably well-intentioned in its
effort to ensure justice through the use of a cautionary jury
instruction on cross-racial identification. Although ajury charge may
not be a perfect solution, the court would have been hard-pressed to
arrive at a result that avoided drawbacks. Through reliance on
behavioral studies, the court's holding is dependent, in part, on a
developing area of research. In addition, the Cromedy court's blanket
prohibition
on
expert
testimony
concerning
cross-racial
identification appears to discount the possibility of developments in
an area that the court itself characterized as unsetded.

49

Thus, the

court ultimately may need to revisit its decision if the scientific
community comes to understand cross-racial recognition with more
particularity. In the interim, however, New Jersey jurors are no
longer permitted to embark upon a "color-blind" evaluation with
respect to an uncorroborated, cross-racial eyewitness identification.'"
joy L. Lindo

court's decision, however, seems to indicate that such a case would merit a crossracial jury instruction.
149 See id. at 120-21,
727 A.2d at 461-62.
150 See id. at 133, 727 A.2d at 467 ("For the sake of clarity,
we repeat that the
purpose of a cross-racial instruction is to alert the jury through a cautionary
instruction that it should pay close attention to a possible influence of race.").

